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 D I S P L A C I N G  H E R M E N E U T I C S  
W I T H  T H E  H E R M E N E U T I C A L ?  
 
NICHOLAS DAVEY 
University of Dundee 
Introduction1 
Given the extensive philosophical problems arrayed against it, should hermeneutics be 
abandoned as an epistemology of interpretation in favor of a reflective pedagogy of practical 
engagement?  Is it not time that hermeneuticians renounce their obsession with legitimizing the 
“truth claims” of experience in favor of what we shall call “the hermeneutical,” that is, submitting 
to the (factical) truths of experience that engagement in practice exposes us to? Perhaps it is now 
appropriate to argue for what will seem a heresy amongst many philosophical hermeneuticians: 
the lesson of practical engagement is that the subjectivity of experience must be taken really 
seriously. 
The following argument is written on the presupposition that the discipline of 
hermeneutics, traditionally understood as an epistemology of interpretation, is bound to fail. The 
nihilistic axiom that there is no truth but only interpretation means that there is no getting to the 
bottom of epistemological argument. The result is indecisiveness, uncertainty and negativity. No 
wonder that hermeneutics and the humanities appear to be in such a methodological crisis. 
However, if we both switch our framework of argument from the epistemological to the 
ontological and treat interpretation not as a subject’s interjection but as a mode of interactive 
 
1 I should like to thank the officers of the North American Society for Philosophical Hermeneutics for inviting me to 
present this paper at their 2018 Annual Conference.  
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participatory practice, understanding can be retrieved not as anything definitive but as something 
perfectible. Should philosophical hermeneutics continue to be treated as a deviant form of 
epistemology, then Bildung (the ability of individuals to build on and have confidence in their 
accumulated experience) is stifled by the indecisive. Epistemological nihilism corrodes belief in 
the worthwhileness of practice. Yet regard hermeneutic engagement as a participatory practice in 
a relational ontology, and the ‘hermeneutical’ becomes an ever fluid movement of insightful 
formation. 
This paper proposes that (1) philosophical hermeneutics considered as a mode of 
epistemological theory should be abandoned in favor of promoting hermeneutics as a form of 
experiential participation. This explains my title. Hermeneutics considered as a warrantable theory 
of knowing must be displaced by an account of hermeneutics as participatory engagement for it is 
in the ‘eventual’ nature of practice that the ‘hermeneutical’ arises. (2) The processes of practical 
engagement will be presented as engendering the occasions in which the ‘hermeneutical’ (an 
experience of understanding’s movement) arises. (3) The arguments concerning practical 
engagement demand an ontological re-reading of subjectivity. No longer should the subject be 
treated as the epistemological anchor point of knowledge but rather as continuously a plurality of 
processes which “subjectivize” as one. (3) The formation of agency is key to my argument and 
explains why I oppose Gadamer’s claim that subjectivity is impotent. Subjectivity as a mode of 
the epistemological subject may be impotent but considered as the coordinating viewpoint or 
perspective of a plurality of interacting processes, it is far from impotent. 
Hermeneutical De-fenestration: On Windows and 
Positions 
To initiate our argument, I borrow two terms from L. Kramer’s text Music as Cultural 
Practice, namely, ‘hermeneutic windows’ and ‘subject-positions.’2 Let us first address the notion 
of a hermeneutic window. Hermeneutic windows frame an event, an occasion. They are an 
opening-out and on-to. They frame a view and render something visible. What makes a window 
‘hermeneutical’ is the ability to disclose a site of breakdown, to reveal how a change of perspective 
can suddenly expose an object of interpretation as fraught with the tensions of unresolved 
problems. Hermeneutical windows open out on to a Spannungsfeld (Nietzsche).  They threaten 
those that look through them with vertigo and, possibly, with conceptual defenestration. When 
texts, paintings or compositions challenge our habitual readings and responses, we become 
disorientated and lose the security of our initial expectancies. Kramer’s windows frame the space 
 
2 Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.   
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of hermeneutical experience, opening spaces in my understanding between what I thought I had 
understood and what, I now realize, I plainly had not. Passing to Kramer’s second term, the notion 
of a subject-position, he treats the act of interpretation as a sense-making process in which a 
hermeneutic subject or agency forms its perspective or viewpoint. Our argument is that subject-
positions are not applied by knowing subjects to the objects of their interpretation (as if an 
epistemological schema antedated any engagement). To the contrary, a subject-position is (in 
Gadamerian terms) the effect and not the cause of an interpretive engagement. The subject-position 
is a consequence of engagement in participatory processes. The ontological consequences are 
discussed below. 
Why am I drawn to my own adaptions of Kramer’s two notions? The reasons are several. 
(1) Hermeneutical windows are subject-positions affording vistas and perspectives which are 
important not so much because of what they look out on to but because of what they reveal of the 
viewing position itself.  It is not that a Cartesian subject is looking out onto a hermeneutical terrain 
but rather that the window itself frames or articulates the complexity, which is the viewer’s mode 
of seeing, a mode of seeing which differentiates it from the perspectives of other interacting 
agencies. (2) Kramer’s metaphors suggest that it is impossible to think of hermeneutic engagement 
or interaction without an appeal to a perspective-setting force or agency. This returns the notion of 
the subject and subjectivity to the center of hermeneutic debate. Both the Heideggerian and 
Gadamerian critiques of the subject and subjectivity are well known. However, the abandonment 
of epistemological approaches to interpretation in favor of an ontological model of hermeneutic 
interaction makes it necessary to re-think the subject and subjectivity. (3) Without the notion of 
engaged subjectivities (here I invoke Nietzsche’s ‘subject as a multiplicity’), education understood 
as transformative practice makes no sense. If education (whatever the discipline) is about anything 
at all, it is surely about the empowerment of a subject-position to engage with confidence in the 
social and cultural terrains it finds itself within. Dialogue, participation and transformative practice 
whether in art, religion or medicine are inconceivable without subject-agencies or -positions. The 
notion of ex-change would be redundant. Hermeneutical education is, arguably, about practical 
empowerment. This is a point worth stressing.  As public education moves towards quantitative 
models of assessment (or normative modes of social compliance) the more it moves away from 
those formative individual practices of engagement and judgement which give such compelling 
force to Gadamer’s notion of Bildung. In arguing this we are not advocating a reactionary return 
to bourgeois notions of the knowing subject as the ground of all discernment, judgement, and taste. 
Articulating inter-action not reaction is our concern. (4) Bildung, considered as an ontological 
process, promises a way of circumventing the negativity of post-structural and deconstructive 
critiques of the knowing subject, critiques which render any notion of hermeneutic transformation 
and education facile. However, if knowing is presented not as the activity of an isolated 
epistemological subject but as the effect of inter-acting subjectivities, a tractable notion of Bildung 
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as practical engagement and transformation can be formulated. This move is dependent upon 
recognizing the antecedence of the ‘hermeneutical.’ The formative narratives indicative of an 
unfolding Bildung are dependent upon the ontological priority of hermeneutical defenestration; 
that is, upon a subject-agency or subject-center undergoing the experience of its leading 
assumptions being challenged by exposure to altogether different and unexpected ways of 
thinking. This predicament we call ‘the hermeneutical.’ Our central proposal is that the primacy 
of hermeneutics as a philosophy of interpretation should be displaced by the “hermeneutical” 
considered as a consequence of ontological inter-action. If hermeneutical reflection is to be 
retrieved from the strictures of post-modern critique the proposal has some merit.  
Access to our primary argument is anticipated by a remark Gadamer makes on a distinction 
of Julius Stenzel.    
 If emphasis has been -rightly- placed on the fact that meaning is related to the “I”, this 
means, as far as hermeneutical experience is concerned, that all meaning that is handed 
down to us finds its concretion in its relation to the “understanding I”  and not in 
reconstructing the originally intending “I”.3 
Stenzel’s differentiation suggests displacing the epistemological (intending) subject with the 
“understanding I.” The latter we shall articulate as a subject-agency both engaged by and in 
participatory processes of transaction. As we shall see to our advantage, there is a provocative 
connection between the “understanding I” and Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. However, let us 
further contextualize the lead argument. 
Subjectivity Dismissed 
If we are defending the view that ‘hermeneutical’ engagement makes no sense without an 
appeal to engaged subjectivities, why does Gadamer adopt such a negative attitude towards 
“subjectivity”?   He speaks specifically of “the impotence of subjective particularity”.4  In such 
passages, Gadamer openly attacks the psychologistic and subjectivist supposition that meaning 
resides in what a subject ‘intends’ or in what volitional consciousness imposes on its world. He is 
clear that subjectivist accounts of meaning are not as they proclaim: spontaneous acts on the part 
of a knowing subject which bring ex nihilo meaning and color into a meaningless world. Such 
“subjects” are not the masters of the meanings they claim to command. 
The anchor point of Gadamer’s critique of “romantic” accounts of meaning lies his reading 
of Hegel. “All self-knowledge arises from what is historically pre-given, what with Hegel we call 
 
3 Julius Stenzel, Über Sinn, Bedeutung, Begriff, Definition, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958. 
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer,Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 489.  
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substance because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions… What we need to discover in 
all that is subjective, is the substantiality that determines it.” 5 This gives a particular nuance to 
Gadamer’s phrase “subjective reflection.” The emphasis is not in fact on the act of a subject 
thinking but on what comes to be reflected in and through that thinking. According to this view, 
meaning resides in the substantive structures of tradition and language? that shape the subject’s 
outlook. Epistemological subjectivity is secondary, dependent upon the wider substantive 
structures that shape it.  Gadamer describes “self-knowledge” accordingly as getting to know not 
one’s subjectivity per se but all that underlies it.6    
Subjectivity Reconsidered 
In the preceding remarks Gadamer’s hostility to subjectivist accounts of meaning is clear. 
Yet, as other passages in Truth and Method make evident, subjective experience is also presented 
in way that is anything but impotent. Other passages present subjectivity as the site of an inner-
historicality of experience.  Gadamer’s account of Aeschylus’s pathei mathos (learning through 
suffering) implies the emergence of a subjectivity that becomes aware of itself in confrontation 
with its limitations, inadequacies and mistakes.7 On this account ‘profound’ experience is far from 
inconsequential but involves the experience of one’s own finitude. Gadamer’s account of pathei 
mathos is a hermeneutical window. Such windows reveal ‘hermeneutical’ experience as a 
contested space where conflicting interpretations in which we are complicit collide.  Plainly, such 
experience can only be undergone by an engaged and embodied subjectivity. On this stands one 
of philosophical hermeneutics’ key claims: subjective awareness only arises because of deep prior 
practical involvements (Dasein). Such reflective awareness is, indeed, a consequence, if not an 
expression, of its preceding practical embeddedness.  
The conundrum is plain. On the one hand we have an argument that with regard to the 
question of meaning, Gadamer derides the impotency of subjectivity and yet, on the other, there is 
the appeal to intense subjectivization (the pathei mathos argument), an experience Gadamer takes 
so seriously as to liken it to religious experience.8 Can these cross-currents of argument be 
reconciled? First, some initial qualifications. Gadamer is certainly right to insist that subjective 
consciousness can never be its own master. It is the product of an epistemé which marks and shapes 
its orientations. That substantiality can, of course, be analyzed, permitting a given subjectivity to 
become more hermeneutically aware of its nature. To a degree, Gadamer’s hermeneutics follows 
a “hermeneutics of suspicion” which for very different reasons also deconstructs the Cartesian 
 
5 ibid p. 302 
6 ibid p. 302.  
7 Hans-Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 356. 
8 ibid. p. 357.  
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epistemological ‘I’. The consequence of this is somewhat nihilistic. Theoretical analysis is, as 
Nietzsche appreciated, disempowering, interminable and alienating.  It questions the veracity of a 
subject’s motives, it leads to endless and irresolvable analytic disputes which, in turn, have the 
effect of alienating subjective consciousness from its practical world. Such confusion has blatantly 
contributed to the current critical demise of both hermeneutics and the humanities. Indeed, the 
argument of this paper is a contribution towards freeing the hermeneutical from this demise.  
The Framing of Argument 
Before we address the current confusions afflicting hermeneutics, let us step back 
momentarily from the main argument to consider its principal points so far. (1) We have 
established the juxtaposition between Gadamer’s critique of the impotence of subjective 
consciousness on the one hand and his crucial positioning of intense personal experience at the 
heart of hermeneutic engagement on the other. (2) The pathei mathos argument neatly maps on to 
Kramer’s distinction between hermeneutical windows framing colliding interpretations and his 
invocation of a struggle towards a sense-making ‘subject position.’  (3) Whereas Kramer and 
Gadamer strongly differentiate between the two elements of this distinction, I would argue that the 
two elements are mutually dependent. There can be no vision of endlessly competing interpretive 
stances other than in relation to the initial interests of distinct subject-positions. It is only because 
‘I’ as a practitioner have strongly held views of a subject-matter that its dissolution into a myriad 
of competing perspectives can pain me. Practical engagement is already presupposed. This favors 
a stronger claim: what comes to frame in a consciousness of competing interpretations is not the 
site of an contested battlefield of opposing perspectives but a coming to consciousness of 
consciousness itself as such a contested site, a consciousness with different ‘voices’, inclinations 
and intuitions vying each with the other to work out a coherent “subject-position” This stronger 
claim establishes the grounds for two further ones. 
(1) The interdependent elements of windows and subject-positions structure what can be 
described as the hermeneutic predicament itself.  The hermeneutic predicament involves not just 
the assertion of our facticity but the experiencing of it. This can be characterized as the constant 
interplay between an environment of competing perspectives each of which has a bearing on a 
subject-agency and the way that agency has to establish its subject-position (perspective, voice or 
outlook).  
(2) All practices embody in their being, hermeneutical predicaments. Practices embrace (to 
adapt MacIntryre’s phrase) ‘continuities of conflict’ over ends, purposes and subject-matters 
implying that a practitioner is constantly challenged by and reviews her ‘subject-position(s).’ 
These two claims underpin my principal argument that ‘the hermeneutical’ should displace 
hermeneutics as a theoretical edifice. Let us now elaborate the equation of practice with the 
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‘hermeneutical’. Heidegger’s notion of Dasein and his articulation of the nature of artwork offer 
useful guidance. 
Practice, Dasein and the Hermeneutical 
Our being-in-the-world (Dasein) is always a being-situated in a historical, cultural world.  
This is another way of saying that Dasein is practical (i.e. we are defined, attuned and constrained 
by practices and implicitly know how to ‘get on’ with the tasks they impose). If Dasein is a 
practical space or a place-holder term for where the multiple processes which constitute our social 
and cultural being intersect, Dasein denotes a porous space in and thorough which different 
practices are interwoven. The processes of practice, the practitioner and the practiced-upon, co-
inhere and are codependent. The space of practice is stressed in the engineering sense, a location 
which articulates an intensity of multiple languages, aspirations and modes of behavior. Practices 
involve liminal spaces which forever point beyond themselves to other articulations of their norms, 
rationales or conventions. In Kramer’s metaphor, practical spaces are windows which reveal 
multiple, shifting commitments and expectations. They bring our hermeneutical being into a 
conscious framework.  
The movements of practical spaces have deep implications for how the practitioner 
understands herself as a practitioner. The co-inherence of practice and practitioner means that the 
practitioner’s notions of what it means to be a virtuous practitioner are live questions. The space 
of practice is always a space of questioning and of being-in-question. Changes in the surrounding 
social and economic circumstances of practice impact upon how a practitioner comes to understand 
herself as a practitioner. The space of practice is, then, always a space of questions and of being-
in-question. In this context, Kramer’s second notion of finding a subject-position is crucial. 
By subject-position, I mean a position of confident coherent action within constantly 
shifting ontological circumstances. When Gadamer speaks of the necessity of finding free spaces 
in higher education, the implication involves more than escaping bureaucratic restraints.9 In any 
practice there is always an initial level of determination and subservience to its traditional norms 
and expectancies. The more practiced a practitioner, however, the more initiated she becomes in 
navigating the continuities of conflict that constitute her practice. Such conflicts, liminal spaces 
and incommensurabilities form the ‘free spaces’ (Gadamer) opened up (made possible) by a 
practice. These spaces open the ‘hermeneutical windows’ by means of which possibilities for 
 
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer, On  Education, Poetry, and History, Applied Hermeneutics, ed. Misled and Nicholson, 
Albany, State University of New York Press, 1992. p.59 
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intervening in a practice arise, interventions upon which the renewal and furtherance of that 
practice depend. Such interventions are ontologically crucial. 
The ontological processes which form each practice are furthered by cycles of non-
identical repetition which allow a practice to become, in Gadamer’s phrase, cumulatively “more” 
by means of repetitions of the same but in endlessly different ways. The cumulative differences 
arising from such repetitions are crucial: they are onto-generative, giving to shape to emergent 
identities, continuities and narrative forms which chart the duration of a practical life. The process 
is one of Bildung, one of formation through practical engagement. In this context, Bildung does 
not concern the molding of an individual according to prevalent cultural norms but involves 
immersion in processes of continual transformation. It is a process in which individual 
(practitioner) and collective (traditions of practice) are mutually dependent and mutable. Kramer’s 
hermeneutical windows do not look out on a fixed landscape. They are reflective spaces. They 
afford remembered passages of experience which taken collectively give rise to a sense of a 
journey unfolding. Each view is non-identical but collectively they come to form an emerging 
sense of the terrain from which a practice has emerged and towards which it is seemingly moving. 
What is essentially involved is an inter-relatedness of movement and the emergence of narrative 
structures it gives rise to. The aesthetic space - which for Heidegger is our experience of the 
artwork - discloses to the spectator the world he or she lives in. It reveals or, rather, it subjects the 
spectator to a way of seeing, making visible things that are hidden in the visual.  
Movement between hermeneutical horizons implies instability: the place of hermeneutic 
practice is accordingly place of risk. As Iser has shown, the ontological location of a practitioner 
in a practical domain places them in a liminal space which puts the practitioner’s “self-
understanding” in question.10 This suggests a clear interactive relation between the ontology of a 
practice - its contested nature - and the self-understanding of a practitioner which, because 
grounded in that practice, is equally riven and contested. Contemporary medical practice is cross-
hatched by religious and political discourse focusing on the body and is, furthermore, subject to 
the continuous influence of Greek ethics and competing historical notions of health, healing and 
sickness. To practice as a present-day medic is to be continually “cross-pressured” (Taylor) by 
variant cultural processes.11 It is also to be cross-pressured by many other contemporary political 
and economic demands.  
Gadamer’s linkage of understanding with its enabling linguistic and historical horizons of 
concern (subject-matters) is a decisive move in the overthrow of the remnants of Kant’s subject-
based epistemological heritage. Yet, if Gadamer’s argument has a short-coming, it is that it 
 
10 Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, p.145 -157. 
11 See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2007. 
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underestimates the complexity of horizons threaded through our existence (Dasein).  
Hermeneutical existence has a denser multi-dimensionality than Gadamer seemingly allows. We 
are perhaps misled by such singular generalizations as the Sprachswelt. Our horizons are multiple: 
existence as social beings is threaded through with numerous ‘practical’ concerns: our sense of 
being a member of a community, of being a father and of being a friend. The demands and 
responsibilities attached to such concerns are not necessarily consistent. Tensions exist both within 
and between their horizons. Nor do these practices exist in isolation. They are linked by a common 
grounding in the Sprachswelt, the ontological base of all practices. Practices are also all subject to 
the common and communizing stresses and strains of facticity. Crucially, these practices involve 
projections (in the Heideggerian sense of the term), each anticipating future and by no means 
consistent outcomes. Yet, clearly, different practical horizons both inform and inflect each other. 
Being a ceramic artist raises the question of what it means to be a good potter. The practice 
projects a credible answer. Because of the inter-connectedness of our cultural environments, an 
exemplar of good ceramic practice (confidence with materials, resolute execution, attaining a 
clarity of form etc.) can open an insight into a musician’s concern with the nature good 
performance practice. As historical, social and linguistic creatures we are constantly cross-
pressured by unresolved questions as to what is meaningful in practices, by questions of how the 
‘virtues’ of good practice might resolve tensions and traumas across the complex range of our 
commitments.  
Practice-discourses are frequently inter-linked by place-holder terms such that an answer 
to what constitutes a brave performance in music can have a bearing upon what is understood as 
courageous performance in poetry or novel writing.  Answers to these questions often lie 
unresolved in memory but on occasion exposure to a courageous performance in music can bring 
to mind an answer to a forgotten question about what it means to face up to the demands of one’s 
materials as a painter. Consideration of these practical virtues also have a bearing upon what it 
means to be a brave, courageous, and open-minded person. There are no definitive answers to 
these questions. Shared placeholder terms allow questions and responses in one practice to inflect 
their counter-parts in another discourse. This returns us to the metaphor of Kramer’s windows. 
The image of looking out on to a plethora of competing interpretations, some 
incommensurable, others inadequate or unresolved, reveals the alleged weakness in hermeneutics 
that deconstruction easily exposes. Nihilism is often presented as the inevitable result of an 
irresolvable ‘conflict of interpretations.’ However, epistemological inconclusiveness and 
undecidability do not constitute objections to the ‘hermeneutical’ but embody its presence. Such 
objections only apply if it is assumed that hermeneutics makes verifiable epistemological claims. 
The burden of our argument is, however, to the contrary: the ‘hermeneutical’ is not primarily a 
theory of knowing but concerns an ontological predicament epitomized in the tensions of practice. 
Apart from failing to realize that inconclusiveness and undecidability constitute the hermeneutic 
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predicament, the problem with deconstruction is that it approaches hermeneutical objects as 
epistemological objects whose ‘truth’ is to be verified by a knowing subject distanced from the 
objects that resist its immediate assimilative categories. There is a mistake in this thinking which 
Heideggerian philosophy should have resolved long ago: hermeneutics is neither theory, nor 
epistemology, but ontology. What is needed is an ontological account of hermeneutical experience, 
not an epistemological account. Let us go back to our earlier invocation Dasein.  
Dasein is not an attribute of a subject’s existence, as if the two were separable. Dasein is a 
subject’s being - it is that living nexus of concerns and interests that configure the “subjectivity” 
(the practical orientation) of that being. Returning to Kramer’s window, we should no longer think 
of an epistemological subject looking out upon a plethora of competing perspectives but, rather, 
think of that constellation as the subject-configuration itself. The ever-shifting field of competing 
interpretations is Dasein, that is, is a subject-agency’s mode of being. Such a notion of the 
hermeneutic subject whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought in general is no 
stranger to Nietzsche. 
The assumption of one single-subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as 
permissible to assume a multiplicity (the subject position is a multiplicity) whose 
interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought in general…  My hypothesis: the 
subject as multiplicity: the continual transitoriness and fleetingness of the subject.12 
This ontological conception of hermeneutical being or Dasein is pluralistic. We are in our engaged 
‘doing’ in? the site of plural practices, historical, linguistic and cultural. What, however, does it 
mean to refer to such a plurality of practices as a site? This returns us to the notion of a subject-
position. How does a multiplicity become “a subject” and how does it gain it cohesiveness and 
coherence? Gadamer has already offered an answer to this in his comment on Stenzel. 
As far as ‘hermeneutical experience’ is concerned, Gadamer contends that the meaning of 
what is handed down to us finds its concretion in the ‘understanding I’ and not in reconstructing 
the originally ‘intending I’. The distinction is suggestive. We are not talking about an “I” (a 
subject) that has ‘understanding’ as one of its modes but, rather, of a mode of understanding 
(Dasein) that configures itself, has become effective as an “I” or subject-position as one of its 
modes. The processes of experience subjectivize, that is, practicing articulates the practitioner.  
When an understanding makes itself manifest it is never, ontologically speaking, ex nihilo 
but always situated in an established play of horizons and concerns. Emergent understanding 
reconfigures what is already in play in a practice. To repeat, the “understanding I” is not an “I” 
that has the attribute of understanding. Rather, it is that mode of understanding (interaction) which 
as a multiplicity itself operationalizes the fiction of being an I. The ‘understanding I” is an 
 
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, London, 1968, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, Sec. 490 
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operational concept (Eugen Fink) developed from within complex process of inter-related modes 
of understanding which allow it to think of and coordinate itself as “one”.13 The defense of such a 
claim is transcendental: coordinated singularity can only be (formally) thought if an appeal to such 
a formal figure of reflection is made.  Without the operational notion of an “understanding I” it 
becomes difficult if not impossible to think of how a multiplicity could coordinate itself as a 
singularity, establish a cohesive narrative and actively manage its collective interests. This, of 
course, only renders such a multiplicity thinkable as an effective singularity. It does not imply that 
it is ontologically singular in any essentialist sense of the term. What these various points suggest 
is that the sphere of understanding - the totality of interactions within a Dasein - is synonymous 
with the sphere of that subject’s (i.e. manifold’s) range of being.  
However, this is emphatically not to say that the sphere of understanding is reducible to 
what is within a subject-manifold’s immediate grasp. Gadamer will insist on the axiom: 
Bewusstsein (consciousness) is always more Being than knowing.  A subject-agency (Dasein) is 
defined by its concerns: it lives in a field of interests, it has worries, is made uneasy and feels both 
anxious and vulnerable. In this context, it is perfectly plausible to say that ‘my practice concerns 
itself with’ or ‘has the following concerns’. This is, in fact, another way of saying that a practice 
has its vulnerabilities and that its interests can be challenged. The being of a subject-agency is 
defined by its fluid condition of being forever cross-pressured by the flow and counter-flow of 
interrelating concerns and dependencies. The subject-position is thus always in question, for the 
being of understanding is always in unstable movement. In other words, the subject-position (the 
“understanding I”) maintains itself as a continuity of operation.  This operation is the subject’s 
being, an endless wrestling of its manifold into a body of coherent interactions able to react to and 
respond to others that pressure and attack it as one.14  Ontologically speaking, the forever contested 
site of understanding is, then, the locus of the subject-position. Gadamer’s aesthetics is helpful 
here. The artwork is not an independent essence or entity to which its historical effects are 
predicated, rather the artwork’s effectivity is its being. So it is also, we contend, with the subject-
position.  
Gadamer’s “understanding I” is not an “I” that understands but rather an understanding 
that has an effectivity as a subject-posture able to interact and engage with other such alignments. 
That understanding (my existence) does not exist apart from its effects: its being is the past and 
future history of those effects and the potentialities they hold. Many of them are unpredictable 
such that practical engagement can be described as a consequentialism of unintended effects. This 
underpins our argument that in higher education negotiating the hermeneutical (the experience of 
 
13 I am grateful to Prof. John Caputo for pointing out the link with Eugen Fink. 
14 See article the very useful article by Pietro Terzi, “The Relevance of Fink’s Notion of Operative Concepts for 
Derrida’s Deconstruction”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol 50, 2019, Issue No. 1. 
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one’s understanding being decisively shifted) should be prioritized over the teaching of hermeneutics 
as a mode of philosophical theory. Engagement in the hermeneutical is to be practically located, 
which is to say, situated, in the cross-pressuring demands of language, history and cultural 
orientation. The challenge for higher education is how to empower engagement in such 
existentially ‘testing’ situations. Here much depends upon on the connotations of the phrase 
‘testing situation’ and whether it is read negatively or positively. This is not an either-or 
juxtaposition but more a question of dialectical entailment, of a positivity of thought being 
contained within a dominant negativity. Kramer’s hermeneutical windows test a subject-position 
in that they indicate the shattering of cherished interpretational expectancies. Yet, this very 
challenge puts the subject-position to the test creatively. Established interpretations do not simply 
fail. They are displaced or set aside as outmoded because shifts in historical and cultural 
circumstances reveal other logical or practical alternatives. Extensions of hermeneutical 
understanding are dependent upon the via negativa of circumstantial challenge and critique. In 
Howard Caygill’s phrase, practice is a device for provoking accidents, a trip or a trap (…) it negates 
what is already given…”15 This emphasizes the ontological priority of practical engagement for it 
is in an through the hermeneutical movements of practice that the “understanding I” can ‘become 
more’.  
Reversing the Emphasis 
In arguing for the primacy of hermeneutical experience, we are not advocating a return to 
an anti-intellectualist position which would displace theory with practice. Far from it, our argument 
offers a careful moderation on Gadamer’s notion of “philosophical hermeneutics,” specifically its 
internal implications. The phrase does not imply that in being philosophical, hermeneutics is or 
should be considered a theory or a philosophy of interpretation. If it is treated as a philosophy or 
as a methodological means to determining the truth of a text, it will fail and collapse into nihilism. 
The finitude of understanding, the perspectival nature of cognition, and the generation of unclose-
able differential and liminal spaces by the application of interpretative method, all imply that 
hermeneutics will fail. Adequacy between hermeneutic object and hermeneutic method is 
impossible to achieve. However, nihilism is not the inevitable result of this seeming impasse. A 
switch to an ontological account of practice moves us away from thinking about hermeneutics as 
a theory of interpretation towards considering the ‘hermeneutical’ as the expression of a practical 
situation. This turn does not entail the negation of philosophical theory within hermeneutical 
practices. Two points support this. (1) Hermeneutical meaning is always embodied. Embodied 
 
15Howard Caygill, Kafka, In the Light of the Accident, London, Bloomsbury, 2016. p. 192  
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meaning is marked by its temporal and spatial signature in historical culture. The anti-
intellectualist claim that theory can be separated from practice is absurd. If all practices are 
culturally shaped, they cannot be separated from their ideational elements. (2) Gadamer makes it 
clear that the philosophical component of hermeneutical experience involves reflecting on what is 
at play within practice and hermeneutic experience. The phrase ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ 
certainly implies reflection on the formal conditions governing the possibilities of understanding, 
but it also entails a reflection on what is at play within hermeneutic experience such that 
philosophical hermeneutics entails a reflecting philosophically upon the conflicts and challenges 
within ‘hermeneutic’ experience. Gadamer always insists that gaining a reflective distance from 
the immediate claims of experience is not to priorities the status of theory but to use theoretical 
reflection to navigate experience in a more insightful manner. Theory becomes a means to deeper 
involvement in practical engagement. There is a clear and substantial corollary to this. 
If philosophical hermeneutics prioritizes not the teaching of hermeneutic theory per se but 
the advancement of hermeneutical reflection on the antecedent conflicts that inevitably emerge 
from within practical engagement, hermeneutical reflection is relevant to any practice where the 
meaning of its goals and aims are contested. Hermeneutic philosophy should no longer be 
cloistered within specialist philosophy programs. In itself, it is not, cannot be taught as, and is not 
defensible as pure theory. Gadamer in fact argues that “theoretical knowledge is originally not 
opposed to practical activity but its highest intensification and perfection.”16 Hermeneutics is not 
metaphysics. To the contrary, hermeneutical reflection becomes more a means of acute listening 
to what is at play within a practice and to the murmurings of what as yet unrealized possibilities it 
might hold. Contested meanings, ends and goals are always historically located and therefore 
subject to many levels and types of interpretation. Of course, given the facticity of existence, no 
end-interpretation is attainable. Yet, by forcing the emergence of a subject-position, what such 
negativity renders attainable is a deeper, better engagement with and grasp of what it at play within 
contested practices. Hermeneutical reflection does not have theoretical knowledge as it aim but a 
greater clarity regarding the aims and likely consequences of one’s practical involvements. No 
practice is problem-free or can avoid controversy.  Hermeneutical reflection is not a philosophical 
add-on to a practice but an essential element of its articulation. Like many of the religious doctrines 
it once served, hermeneutics has become fully secularized. In so doing, it is has become relevant 
to how any form of practical engagement can reflect on the constant challenge of change and 
disruption. The educational relevance of hermeneutic reflection is perfectly clear. It is engagement 
in the challenges of practice that establish points of entry into the teaching of hermeneutic theory. 
Theory as such should not be taught as the basis of practical engagement but only as a way of 
 
16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, On Education , Poetry, and History, Applied Hermeneutics, Albany, State University of 
New York Press, 1992, p. 19 
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elucidating what such engagement entails. Returning briefly to an insight of Heidegger is 
instructive.  
By prioritizing ontological engagement (practice) over (theory), we, in effect, follow 
Heidegger’s prior ordering of Dasein (practice) over interpretation (elucidatory attempts to draw 
out what is entailed in Dasein).17  Heidegger specifically equates Dasein with the ontological 
priority of understanding (Verstehen) which Gadamer, in turn, supplants with his derivative notion 
of Sprachlichkeit. Interpretation for Heidegger is secondary: it that entails that reflective effort to 
draw out our grasp of a practice especially when in Wittgenstein’s terms, we no longer “know how 
to go on.”  An analogy with Kramer’s window is pertinent. What in the Heideggerian model 
stimulates ‘interpretation’ is a breakdown within understanding grasped as Dasein. This we have 
presented as a network set of practical orientations, a Spannungswelt, the movements of which both 
ground and express themselves in one’s being-in-the-world, a process of being revealed in and 
through the movement of one’s practices. We may also equate the facticity of existence with 
understanding: the facticity of one’s being in continuous question about the direction and limits of 
one’s practical being. Here we come to a major juncture in our argument, a poignant consequence 
of the philosophical figuring of interpretation as the elaboration of what is within understanding. 
Understanding in Heidegger’s sense is synonymous with Dasein and Dasein concerns our 
involvement in a range of practices the movement of which constitutes our being-in-the world. 
This suggest that, in the first instance, the role of the hermeneutical pedagogy should lead the 
practitioner into deep immersion in the operational practices that constitute her being. Such 
immersion is dialectical. On the negative side, no interpretation of a practice will be final or 
exhaustive but, on the positive side, it enhances one’s stock of possible reference points when it 
comes to achieving future new alignments of meaning. Here pedagogy should linger and dwell 
with those moments of hermeneutic opening when a practice starts to break down or when, to use 
John Millbank’s phrase “the word becomes strange.” [citation needed] Such moments of crisis and 
challenge are of supreme ‘hermeneutic’ value in that they begin to reveal what is operative beneath 
the assumptions and expectations of a practice. It is here that ‘hermeneutic listening’ is of 
paramount importance. The teacher should not lead the student into hermeneutic theory per se, as 
if moments of crisis were problems requiring conceptual solution. To the contrary, teacher and 
student should travel further into such moments of defenestration trying to sense where the broken 
shards of a practice intimate a pathway of thought which might lead beyond a given impasse. Of 
course, the rich endowment of hermeneutical philosophy can and should be used in evolving of 
such pathways but (and this is the key point), it is the demands of practice that call hermeneutical 
theory into play and not the reverse. This emphasizes Heidegger’s claim that interpretation (the 
 
17 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. 82ff. 
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utilization of theory) is only a means to draw out what is already actually or potentially at play 
within understanding (Dasein). This re-states and our primary argument. 
‘Hermeneutic experience’ grasped as the breaking of projected expectancies and the 
challenges of facticity is necessarily and unavoidably indicative of our practical being. However, 
the disappearance of truth and skepticism with regard to meaningful existence are only negatives 
in an epistemological perspective. Within practice ontologically conceived, negativity conveys a 
positivity: the possibility of coming to think differently about a practice and its subject-matters. 
This is why the practice of learning to dwell within moments of hermeneutical crisis is important. 
The skill is ontogenetic: it gives rise to something beyond itself. In learning to respond to negative 
challenges, the practitioner develops a repertoire of responses which builds the narrative of both 
the practitioner and her practice. The growth of such responses builds practical confidence: we 
“learn how to go on” and to diminishes anxiety about the facticity of existence. Nothing could be 
more instructive in times of crisis. For the reflective practitioner, negativity invites enhanced 
involvement in their practice, an invitation to become more.  This implies that ‘hermeneutical’ 
engagement (practical involvement) should gain precedence over, displace the priority of, but not 
negate hermeneutic theory.  It is a question of emphasis and of proper ontological ordering. 
Conclusion; Practice and Navigating the Negative  
If hermeneutics is treated as a body of philosophical theory which establishes models of 
how texts, art-works and historical artefacts are to be interpreted, it will fail. Considered as an 
epistemology of interpretation, hermeneutical theory dies by its own hand. The more interpretation 
pursues the “truth” of its object, the more it will fail. As Wolfgang Iser has so effectively shown, 
interpretation, rather than seizing its object convincingly, only succeeds in differing it, opening 
further liminal (but luminous) differential spaces.18 However, this is a negative result only if we 
persist in treating hermeneutics as an epistemological procedure rather than as offering an 
ontological account of practice. Practice considered as ontological engagement does not entail 
closure but the opening of liminal spaces capable of extending options for the agency of a subject-
position. This switch to an ontological account of interpretive practice moves us away from 
considering “hermeneutics” as a theory towards considering it as a way of reflecting on the 
entailments of participatory engagement in practice. In essence, the switch would entail displacing 
‘hermeneutics’ with the “hermeneutical.’  By the ‘hermeneutical,’ we mean precisely those intense 
moments reflexive awareness whereby we are brought to see our practice and our role within it 
profoundly differently. Such experience is deeply affecting if not disorientating. And yet, these 
 
18 Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, p.146-152 
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moments of negativity have dialectical twist to them: they always reveal other interpretive 
possibilities to how we now think of ourselves as competent agencies. This is why practice and its 
associated subjectivities are more fundamental to education than theory.  
No practice whether literary or mathematical can ever be reduced to theory alone. It is 
therefore quite impossible to anticipate all the possibilities latent with a practice capable of 
extending our understanding of both it and the consequences of our involvement in it. Practice 
always involves a consequentialism of unintended effects. Only our involvement in a practice will 
draw out its unseen possibilities. As Caygill has suggested, practices are devices for creating 
revealing and insightful accidents. Such accidents may be indicative of moments of crisis, but they 
also mark the point where negativity and suffering become constructive. Each subject-position is 
a position un-resolved, always shifting and moving: the hermeneutic turmoil of a subject-position 
(practitioner) is its being.  This establishes our principal point. Ontologically speaking, the 
‘hermeneutical’ (practical engagement) has priority over hermeneutics (theory). The precondition 
of learning is hermeneutic defenestration and defenestration the condition of a new subject-
position emerging. The formation of a new alignment of meaning is the achievement of a new 
subject-position. That achievement is made possible only by an ontically prior immersion in 
practice and, as such, is a new event in the Sprachswelt (i.e. the world of understanding in 
Heidegger’s sense). The emergence of a new-subject position marks both the occasion of an 
‘understanding “I”’ achieving a further moderation of its being and an addition to the stock of 
meaning-alignments (other possible subject-positions) within the Sprachswelt. That addition 
enriches the hermeneutical-existential options for other subject-agencies and with that enrichment 
the being of the Sprachswelt (the totality of practices) is increased.  
 
 
